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Preface
Business formation is a major source of aggregate fluctuations and job creation, hence it is
not surprising that its contraction (in US and Euro Area) in the wake of 2008 financial crisis
played an important role in amplifying and propagating the negative consequences on the
economy. The period between 2007 and 2010 has witnessed an unprecedented decline of 25
percent in the number of entrants in the United States. This was an outcome driven partly
by the tightened credit standards and the fall in lending volumes. Given the significance
of firm creation in the economy there has been a growing literature to document firm entry
dynamics and to study the role it plays in transmitting various types of shocks. The topic
has gained even wider attention after the seminal paper by Bilbiie et al. (2012) in which the
authors presented evidence that variation in the number of producers is generally associated
to the length of a business cycle. Therefore, they constructed a DSGE model characterized
by monopolistic competition and endogenous number of producers, where the latter feature
generates an important propagation mechanism of productivity improvements. The setup was
able to explain the pro-cyclical behavior of entry and profits. In that paper, broad view of
producer entry is taken into account that also incorporates product creation. Later works such
as La Croce and Rossi (2018), Bergin et al. (2018) and Siemer (2016) have introduced financial
frictions to understand how deterioration in credit conditions would affect the economy through
firm entry channel. Having said that, my dissertation also aims to contribute in this regard.
Motivated by empirical observations the approach in my thesis is theoretical, which provides a
framework to capture some of the transmission channels that were missing in previous works.
Data from the Euro Area in the post-2008 period reveal some interesting patterns on bank
loan rates to small and large corporations: The spread between interest rates on large and small
loans increased, meanwhile it became greater when the loan volumes got smaller. Studying
heterogeneity in the borrowing costs that face enterprises with different sizes dates back to
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Bernanke et al. (1994). Considered to be riskier, smaller
firms are subject to higher monitoring costs by the lenders and they are more likely to suffer
during crisis. But start-ups also rely on bank loans to cover their initial set-up costs and are
even more opaque than smaller-younger firms. Robb and Robinson (2014) used confidential
data from Kauffman Firm Survey (a survey on around 5,000 new businesses in US) to show
that newly founded firms depend heavily on outside debt financing (bank loans and business
credit lines). They found that the average quantity of bank funding is seven times greater
than the average quantity of inside-financed debt, and that the number of firms relying on
external debt is three times larger than the number of firms relying on inside debt. Also,
a study on financing start-ups in Italy by Bonaccorsi di Patti and Nigro (2018) conducted
on large database between 2003 and 2010 documented that 55% of the start-ups depend on
financial intermediaries, mainly banks. In addition, they showed that post-crisis share of start-
ups using bank credit declined by five percentage points relative to the pre-crisis share of 50%.
Thus, new entrants experience reduced access to external funds and have lower bargaining
power during a period of bank funding difficulty. Such frictions play a role in preventing
or discouraging start-ups from being launched. In addition, entrants are more vulnerable to
changes in bank competition levels. In fact, bank market power presents itself as a barrier
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to entry as shown by Cetorelli and Strahan (2006). This concludes that financing start-ups
plays an important role in transmitting feedback coming from the credit suppliers. In order
to capture this link, the first chapter entitled Sunk Costs and Endogenous Firm Entry:
Borrowing From Imperfect Banks develops a DSGE model characterized by endogenous
firm entry and imperfect banking, where both incumbents and entrants borrow from banks
in different interest rates. For incumbents, the loans are to cover the production costs, while
entrants demand them to finance the initial set-up fees. The introduction of such a friction in
the firm entry level allows the endogenous cost of entry to fluctuate in the borrowing costs. I
find that the impact of the real and financial shocks is amplified because of the sunk cost upon
entry, and that the model exhibits higher volatility as the spread in interest rates on loans gets
wider.
This configuration has another advantage when it comes to expansionary monetary shocks.
In line with evidence, the model with price rigidity predicts pro-cyclical dynamics for entry
in response to exogenous drop in policy rate, which reverses the counter-cyclical behavior of
entrants in the original sticky price version of Bilbiie et al. (2007) that contradicted empirical
observations. As a result, the model constitutes a step towards richer framework that embeds
important features with the aim to investigate further questions in policy intervention analysis.
Going back to the origin of the financial crisis, the burst of house bubbles triggered unpar-
alleled amounts of loan defaults, which gives rise to a legitimate question: How the process of
firm creation was impacted by such events? Taking a look at US quarterly data on establish-
ment birth rates and bank charge off rates gives us some insight on the magnitudes of those
rates’ deviations from their averages1. For the sample period 1992:Q3-2019:Q4 the mean birth
annual rate is 13.43%, while the charge-off rate’s is 0.86%. However, the birth rates declined
significantly during the Great Recession hitting its lowest level of 11.46% in 2009 which con-
stituted 8.68% decrease from the previous year’s rate and 14.63% from the mean. Meanwhile,
there was a sharp rise in charge off rates in the same period with the rate reaching its highest
level of 2.65% in 2009, being 1.43% in 2008.
Analyzing the cyclical behavior of establishment birth levels, bank charge-off volumes, house
prices, and their correlation patterns observed in US data especially in the build up to and in
the period of Great Recession, suggests that business formation reacted to asset price varia-
tions and default surprises, hinting to a crucial role in transmitting house demand shocks and
in magnifying the adversity of debt defaults. The second chapter entitled Loan Defaults in
Endogenous Firm Entry Framework discusses these observations with the aim to study
the interaction between house prices, firm entry, and loan defaults. I present evidence through
Structural Vector Autoregressive Model (SVAR) that reveals positive pro-cyclical response of
birth to house price shock, and negative reaction to loan default shock. Then I develop a
DSGE model characterized by endogenous firm entry that is able to predict and explain these
responses. The endogeneity of collateral constraint and firm creation is in the core of the
model’s mechanism which works in the following way: Loan defaults, originated in the house-
hold sector and driven by collapse in house prices, distort the flow of credit. The losses incurred
by the lenders reduce their ability to extend loans, thus financially constrained entrepreneurs
-who rely on external finance to invest in firm entry- are affected as well. These investors ex-
perience decline in their collateral value -in this case houses- and face higher borrowing costs.
Eventually, number of entrants drops and the contraction in total output is amplified.
The model developed in this chapter is populated by three types of households: lender,
“unproductive” borrower, and investor borrower, incorporated with a banking sector in the
1Birth rate is the percentage of new created private establishments in the total number of existing ones,
while charge-off rate is defined to be the net charge-offs of a bank divided by its outstanding loan amount and
expressed as an annual percentage rate. The loan charge off data discussed here are for all bank loans and for
all households.
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extended version. The default shock is defined as a reallocation of resources from lenders to
borrowers as in Iacoviello (2015). In addition, the model distinguishes between two types of
default surprises that come from the two distinct types of borrowers, and comparing their
implications allows us to highlight the role of the shock’s origin in the amplification story.
House preference shock is also studied which can be perceived as house demand shift that is
directly responsible in relaxing or tightening the collateral constraint of the borrowers. Also,
the agents are heterogeneous across their masses, a feature that plays a role in the size of
the shock’s impact. Last but not least, some second moments generated by the model with
its extended version are reasonably close to their data counterparts, particularly the standard
deviations of the relevant variables as fractions to the output’s.
Given the importance of firm creation in business cycle, the two chapters investigate some
important channels that affect firm entry, particularly the ones that have impact on the access
to external finance. In times of funding difficulties it is highly likely that we fail to observe
businesses that would have been created otherwise, an outcome that obviously has an influence
on economy’s growth. The frameworks developed in this thesis have the potential to be incor-
porated with additional elements that can study policy measures that target the requirements
of funding entrants and their participation in the credit market.
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Chapter 1
Sunk Costs and Endogenous Firm
Entry: Borrowing From Imperfect
Banks
1.1 Introduction
It is well documented that firm creation is a crucial aspect of business cycles. In the US,
adverse financial shocks in 2007-9 years were associated with a fall in the creation of new firms.
Many European countries have witnessed similar firm dynamics in the post-2008 period. The
declining pattern of number of enterprises and birth rates1 in that period is evident in Figures
1.1 and 1.2 which display the dynamics in US and several European countries2. For all the
countries shown, the figures illustrate how the total number of enterprises started to fall in
the wake of the financial crisis triggered by the sharp drop in firm entry during year 2008
relative to the previous year. The dynamics in US and UK are quite similar (Figure 1.1),
where the recovery started after the recession period and earlier than the European countries
-Italy, Spain and Portugal- who were subject to another recession period (2011-2013) and were
hit hard during European debt crisis. In the latter countries, it can be noticed that the lower
birth levels were prolonged during the second recession and the recovery of enterprise levels
was delayed (Figure 1.2).
Evidence also suggests that weaker bank competition serves as a barrier to entry, thus if
the initial set-up costs that are necessary to launch start-ups are financed through bank loans,
then some aspects of the banking system -like bank market power or unexpected crunch in
credit supply- and the presence of dispersion between interest rates of large and small loans
should have consequences on firm entry levels. Hence, the aim of this paper is to address
the following question: To what extent is the reliance of entrants on bank loans (in their
pre-operational phase) important for business fluctuations? In other words, how productivity
improvement, credit contraction, bank competition, and monetary shock impact the economy
in an environment where entrants demand loans in order to cover their initial set-up costs?
To address these issues, I develop a DSGE model characterized by endogenous firm entry
and imperfect banking where both incumbents and entrants borrow in different costs. The
heterogeneity in borrowing fees affects the fluctuations of the entry cost, whose endogeneity
plays an important role in the transmission mechanism. In addition, I extend the model to
incorporate nominal rigidity and suggest a new way to reverse the counter-cyclical behavior of
1The birth rate is defined as the number of enterprise births divided by the number of active enterprises in
the current period.
2US data are obtained from Bureau of Labor Statistics, while for the European countries the data are






































































































































































Figure 1.1: Dynamics of birth and total number of enterprises in UK and US (annual data for
































































































































































































































































Figure 1.2: Dynamics of birth and total number of enterprises in Italy, Portugal and Spain
(annual data).
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firm entry in the face of monetary shock which was implied by the original sticky price version
of Bilbiie et al. (2007), a response that contradicted the empirical observations.
Many studies were devoted to explain the empirical patterns of procyclicality of firm entry
and profits, predicting the transmission of shocks through the extensive margin of investment.
Lewis (2006) tested those predictions and found significant response of firm entry to expansion-
ary shocks to productivity, aggregate spending, monetary policy, and entry costs. Also, Broda
and Weinstein (2010) provided evidence that net product creation is strongly pro-cyclical in the
U.S economy. Bilbiie et al. (2012) set up a DSGE model (henceforth BGM) that successfully
explains these empirical patterns, in which the creation of new firms was also interpreted as
producing new varieties. They emphasize the importance of endogenous firm entry as a major
source of business cycle fluctuations. The model is characterized by endogenous product cre-
ation (firm entry) and monopolistic competition with imperfect price adjustments, departing
from the assumption of fixed number of firms. They showed how economic expansion im-
plies higher entry rates, and the sunk entry fee introduced in the model generates a new and
potentially important endogenous propagation mechanism.
On the other hand, financial frictions are mainly attributed to information asymmetry,
which gives rise to heterogeneity in the borrowing costs that face the firms. Large and already
established firms have easier access to outside financing compared to the smaller-younger firms,
because more information on their creditworthiness is available and they are less likely to
default on their debts. The heterogeneity in creditworthiness among large and small firms has
been studied before. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) have studied credit market imperfection’s
impact, and found that the negative effects on investment tend to be more severe for smaller
firms. Also, Bernanke et al. (1994) argued that small firms are likely to bear the burden of an
economic downturn due to the higher agency costs they face when borrowing in credit markets.
In fact, the reliance of small firms on banks -with fewer external financing choices relative to
mature firms- tends to create sharp dispersion in the spread during crisis. Holton and McCann
(2017) analyzed the determinants of this spread based on bank data from twelve euro area
countries from 2007 to 2015, and found that bank market power can lead to disproportionate
rise in lending cost for smaller firms, which in turn worsens the impact of a weak macroeconomy.
Figure 1.3 shows the monthly evolution of the spread between annualized interest rates charged
on small and large bank loans that are extended to corporations in the euro area. These
loans serve as a proxy for loans to small and large enterprises3. The blue plot represents
the ratio between the borrowing costs of loans that are up to e1 million and that are over
e1 million, while the red one plots the ratio between the interest rates of small loans that
are below e0.25 million and large loans that are over e1 million4. Besides capturing the
dispersion in the borrowing fees, these ratios are proxies for the markup applied by the banks
on small loans (demanded by small firms and entrants) over the fee on large loans (demanded by
incumbents and large corporations). Two pivotal observations appear in this graph. Firstly,
it is noticeable that the markup -which captures the spread or the financial fragmentation-
increased significantly in the post-2008 period. Secondly, the fragmentation is larger when the
loan volumes are smaller (the red plot is always above the blue one), suggesting that smaller
enterprises are charged higher interest rates on loans because of the lower bargaining power
they have.
However, start-ups are even more opaque than smaller-younger firms and are considered
to be riskier therefore they are subject to higher monitoring costs by the lenders, hence the
negative shocks would affect them in a stronger manner even in the pre-production stage of
the firm’s life cycle. Empirical observations suggest that bank concentration implies less entry,
3Data on bank interest rates for different loan categories to corporations are provided online by European
Central Bank (MIR - MFI Interest Rate Statistics).
4Data for loans below e0.25 million before year 2010 are not available.
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Figure 1.3: Spread in the annualized interest rates between large and small loans (Euro area).
given that a potential entrant finds it more difficult to gain credit access. Cetorelli and Strahan
(2006) have investigated the direct impact of bank market power on the industry structure in
a study conducted on US local markets for banking and non-financial sectors. They found
that higher bank competition is associated with greater entry and increasing number of total
establishments and with smaller average firm size, whereas no effect is detected on large firms
mainly because of their access to various financial resources. It is not surprising that young
businesses were hit relatively hard in the Great Recession, thus the channel through which
the shock is transmitted is not only through existing producers. Although incumbent firms are
indeed affected by disturbances generated in the financial sector, the entrants are also subject to
these impacts significantly. In addition to the use of inside resources (family, friends), start-ups
in their initial stages of life also rely on bank debt to cover their initial sunk costs. Robb and
Robinson (2014) discussed evidence from the US supporting this claim. They used restricted-
access version of data from Kauffman Firm Survey5 and found that newly launched firms are
financially dependent on external channels and bank debt to a surprising high degree. They
documented that the average amount of bank funding is seven times greater than the average
amount of inside-financed debt, while firms that rely on outside debt are three times as many
as the ones that rely on inside debt. Furthermore, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Nigro (2018) studied
a large database of Italian start-ups between 2003 and 2010, finding that 55% of the start-ups
depend on external finance, mostly from banks6. Furthermore, they showed that post-crisis
share of start-ups borrowing from banks declined by five percentage points relative to the
pre-crisis share of 50%, pointing out that tighter credit supply conditions would discourage or
prevent new businesses to start, acting as a selection mechanism at birth. In a study by Siemer
(2016) on the financial crisis in US, the author attributed the slow recovery after the crisis to
the reduction of the number of firms, driven by the inability of new businesses to get sufficient
5The Kauffman Firm Survey is an annual survey of 4,928 newly formed businesses in US (birth year of those
strat-ups is 2004).
6Another study conducted on Belgian start-ups concludes that bank debt is the most important source of
their funding (see Deloof and Vanacker (2018)).
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funds, documenting that small business loans fell sharply by 4% in 2009, and 6% in 2010. These
facts suggest that firm creation and its expansion play a crucial role in transmitting financial
shocks, and that the extensive margin of activity has non-negligible impact on the economy7.
Based on this, I focus in this study on business formation’s channel through a DSGE
set-up characterized by endogenous firm entry and monopolistic banking. The latter is a
feature presented by Gerali et al. (2010) in a DSGE model where they introduced imperfectly
competitive banking sector in order to understand the role of banking in the transmission
of monetary impulses and credit supply shocks to the real economy. In order to link firm
entry with imperfect banks, La Croce and Rossi (2018) built a DSGE model to study firms
dynamics in the presence of inefficient banks that cannot ensure against the risk of firms
default. They found that endogenous entry serves as propagation mechanism for both real
and financial shocks, and that the response of the economic activity is more persistent. They
described financial frictions by assuming that only the operating firms borrow from banks in
order to cover their production costs. However in this work I add another friction, in addition
to the incumbent the novelty is to assume that entrants rely on bank funds to cover their
initial sunk costs. This is the crucial modeling device that captures how financial shocks affect
the economy by influencing the financial needs of the entrants. I also model heterogeneity in
the borrowing fees that face the firms, which creates dispersion that reflects the diversity in
the creditworthiness between incumbents and entrants, an important element to explain the
immediate impact of shocks on entry cost. The endogenous dynamics of entrants’ borrowing
cost -connected to the monopolistic nature of banks- lie at the core of our model, and its higher
volatility than incumbents’ borrowing cost causes fluctuations in entry cost. On the other hand,
Bergin et al. (2018) have studied the need of firm’s external borrowing for its startup costs
through the endogenous choice between alternative means of financing, and found that financial
shocks are propagated through firm entry. However, their model is absent of imperfect banking
system, hence fluctuations in loan rates spread are not taken into account, nor the impact of
competition among monopolistic banks upon entry.
Number of key results emerge from the model. Firstly, the impact of the shocks is amplified
compared to a model without borrowing in the entrant’s level and to a model without a spread
in borrowing costs. Moreover, larger spreads in interest rates on loans imply higher volatility
of firm entry and output. Secondly, in response to an increase in bank concentration (decrease
in bank competition) the number of entrants declines hence the total number of firms as well.
Thirdly, in the face of tighter credit supply number of entrants drops and the recovery of the
economy is delayed, a result that is in line with the findings of Siemer (2016), who argues that
a portion of bank dependent stat-ups failed to enter the market during the financial crisis, and
the recession was prolonged because of missing generation of firms. The model also predicts
that the ratio of entrant loans to total loans decreases after credit crunch which coincides
with the finding by Bernanke et al. (1994) which states that borrowers who face higher agency
costs should end up receiving relatively lower share of extended credit. Fourthly, unlike the
benchmark sticky price model of Bilbiie et al. (2007), our model with nominal rigidity predicts
a rise in both firm entry and consumption in the wake of an exogenous contraction in policy
rate thanks to entry cost’s dependence on borrowing fee, a result that agrees with empirical
evidence provided by Bergin and Corsetti (2005), Lewis (2009), and Poutineau and Vermandel
(2015). The latter evaluated the effect of financial frictions on the extensive margin of activity
by estimating a model on US data over a sample period from 1993 to 2012, and their main result
was that restrictive monetary policy is followed by a drop in the number of firms, and that the
bank lending conditions is a transmission channel for monetary policy shocks, also stating that
7Many findings also highlighted the role of new young businesses in job creation as well, and captured
the importance of financial constraints that face small-young firms in explaining the unemployment dynamics
around the Great Recession (see Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Duygan-Bump et al. (2015)).
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financial shocks had depressing impact on firm entry since 2009. Apart from entry, the role
of firm’s exit was explored by Rossi et al. (2015) and Rossi (2019) in a NK-DSGE framework
and monopolistic banking where the firms’ exit is endogenous as well as the entry, and the
authors underlined the exit margin as another important transmission channel of shocks. The
model anticipated endogenous counter-cyclical number of firms destruction, and generated a
stronger propagation mechanism compared to efficient banks model. In line with the empirical
patterns and the theoretical DSGE models developed so far, we notice that firms’ entry link
between the economy and the credit suppliers represents an important transmission channel,
since financial ability is a critical factor in determining the creation of a firm. Moreover, our
qualitative conclusions remain unchanged by considering other types of entry costs.
In what follows, section 1.2 presents the baseline model with flexible prices, section 1.3
demonstrates the results, section 1.4 extends the model by incorporating sticky prices, section
1.5 considers other entry cost definition, and section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The Baseline Model
The economy in the baseline model is populated by households, firms and banks. Banks
operate under monopolistic competition, who as financial intermediaries get deposits from the
households at the policy rate and supply loans to the two types of firms: incumbents and
entrants. To introduce heterogeneity between the borrowing costs of the two types, suppose
that incumbents borrow at a rate iIt whereas the entrants borrow at higher rate i
E
t assuming that
monopolistic banks are able to exercise their market power only on entrants. This assumption
reflects the fact that bank competition has no significant effect on large establishments, an
observation that is documented by Cetorelli and Strahan (2006). The dispersion in the lending
fees is crucial for the analysis of this study, as I want to isolate the impact of the shocks on
the entrants in order to understand how credit weakening and bank competition affect the
economy through entry costs and firm creation process. Both incumbents and entrants borrow
at the start of the period to cover their production and entry fees respectively, and repay them
back with their respective interests at the end of the period. This feature introduces a cost
channel where the marginal cost depends directly on the borrowing fee (see Ravenna and Walsh
(2006)).
In the following subsections I present and solve each agent’s problem and provide the
associated conditions.
1.2.1 Household
A representative household has a unit mass. She consumes, works, lends deposits to the banks
at the policy rate, and buys equity shares from the incumbent firms as well as the entrants. On
her income side, she receives wages, interests on the deposits, and dividends from producing



































The demand for each consumption good can be obtained by minimizing total expenditure∫
Nt






The household is subject to the following budget constraint (in real terms):
Ct +Dt + vt(Nt +N
E
t )xt+1 ≤ wtLt +
(1 + it−1)
1 + πt
Dt−1 + (dt + vt)Ntxt (1.5)
Dt represents desired loans supplied by the household to the banks (deposits) at the nominal
interest rate it (the policy rate), while πt ≡ Pt−Pt−1Pt−1 is the inflation rate. Lt is labor supplied
by the household to both incumbents and entrants, while wt is the real wage.
As in BGM the household buys equity shares from both existing firms (incumbents) and
start-up firms (entrants). xt represents the share invested in each firm, vt is firm’s real value
of share, Nt is the number of operating firms, N
E
t is the number of new entries (or the number
of new varieties) and dt is the real dividends received from each incumbent.



















In each period t the household chooses Ct, Dt, Lt, xt+1, and the first order conditions are:


































is the expectation operator. Equation (1.7) represents the consumption Euler equation, while
(1.8) is the labor supply and (1.9) is the Euler equation for share holding. To get (1.9) we used
the law of motion of the number of firms: Nt+1 = (1− δ)(Nt +NEt ), where δ is the fraction of
existing firms that exits the market ((1− δ) is the survival rate). From (1.9) we can solve for










is household’s stochastic discount factor. This expression means
that firm’s current value (both for entrants and incumbents) is equal to the expected future





There is a continuum of incumbents located on a segment with mass Nt. They produce differen-
tiated consumption goods under monopolistic competition in a flexible price setting using only
labor, with substitutability between goods θ > 1. Firm i maximizes each period’s real profits
by choosing labor LC,i,t and the price of the good Pi,t using the technology YC,i,t = AtLC,i,t.






where YC,t is the total consumption output and Pt is the price index.
They also borrow the amount bIi,t from banks at the beginning of the period to pay wages
with borrowing cost iIt , hence: b
I
i,t = wtLC,i,t to be paid back with interests at the end of the
period.
Let µi,t be the real marginal cost that faces the incumbent, hence the Lagrangian associated













Hence, the first order conditions are:













where equation (1.13) represents the relative price that firm i chooses at period t.























where we denoted ρt ≡ Pi,tPt as the relative price. Note that Nt enters the equations describing
the final output and the relative price, where the latter reflects consumer’s love for variety.
Symmetry among the operating firms also yields the following total loan demand and total




LC,t = NtLC,i,t (1.18)






The incumbent’s profits dt can be derived starting from the following expression:
dt = ρtYC,i,t − (1 + iIt )wtLC,i,t
This can be elaborated using the first order conditions (1.12) and (1.13) and the demand curve













Entrants (The Creation of New Varieties)
At the start of each period a prospective entrant j faces an initial fixed sunk entry fee of fE
units of effective labor, which is equal to wt
fE
At
units of consumption goods, which represents
the real wages paid to the labor units devoted to firm creation purpose. We assume that the






The borrowing cost is iEt and the loan is to be paid back at the end of the period with interests
after selling the shares of the new created firm to the household. The value of the share (the
value of the new firm or new variety) is anticipated correctly by the entrant which is computed
according to (1.10), and entry occurs until firm value matches the total debt (total cost of
entry), hence until the following condition is satisfied:






We denote the total number of new entrants by NEt and the quantity of labor needed to create
those firms (new varieties) by LEt , therefore the relationship between the two quantities can be














The addition of borrowing cost to the entrant’s problem will have amplifying impact on the
economy directly through entry channel by affecting the cost of new firm creation. Any change
in the cost of external financing will have an impact on the entry cost for the bank dependent
entrants, hence on the mass of new firms.
New entrants start to produce next period allowing a one period time to build lag in the
model. We assume δ ∈ (0, 1) to be a death shock that hits all firms of both types at the end
of each period, which causes a constant fraction δ of the existing firms to exit the market,
implying the following law of motion for the operating number of firms in the economy:
Nt = (1− δ)(Nt−1 +NEt−1) (1.23)
Finally, given that the value of the share is based on future expected profits, then the values
of new and existing firms are the same. This is because both types of firms expect the same
future profits and face the same death shock at the end of the period.
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1.2.3 The Bank Sector
We model the bank sector as a variant of Gerali et al. (2010). There are two branches in
the banking sector: the wholesale branch and the retail branch. The latter has a unit mass
and operates in an imperfect competition regime. Before modeling each sector, we present the
demand side of the loans.
The Loans Demand
Recall that banks can exercise their market power only on the entrants hence applying a mark-
up over the marginal cost only in the entrants’ case. Therefore, we introduce the demand
schedule of entrants’ loans. We assume that loan demand bEt is an aggregate CES basket of
differentiated loans bEj,t, each supplied by a bank j, while the elasticity of substitution between









Given the Dixit-Stiglitz framework the entrant decides the amount of loans needed by mini-





j,tdj given the interest rate i
E
j,t charged by bank j. Hence






where iEt is the aggregate interest rate charged on loans to entrants by the banks, which is









We assume that the wholesale branch collects the deposits from the households at the policy
rate it, and issues intra-bank loans Bt to the retail sector at the rate i
W
t by combining the
deposits Dt and bank capital Kt. In doing so, they are subject to quadratic adjustment costs
whenever the capital-to-assets ratio Kt
Bt









As to be seen next, this cost which is related to the capital position of the bank allows
us to study the impact of credit contraction originated from the bank sector. Bank capital
is accumulated through the following law of motion in nominal terms: KNt =
(
(1 − η)KNt−1 +
JN,bt−1
)





(1− η)Kt−1 + J bt−1
)
εKt (1.28)
where J bt is the real profits made by the retail sector, and η measures resources used in managing
bank capital. εKt is an AR(1) process that highlights a shock to the bank capital.
The wholesale branch maximizes its profits by choosing the amount of deposits Dt and the
amount of loans Bt to the retail branch, subject to the balance sheet constraint:
max
{Dt,Bt}









s.t: Bt = Dt +Kt (1.29)
The FOCs of the problem implies a spread between the intra-loan rate iWt and the policy rate
it, which can be described by the following equation:








This condition highlights the optimal behavior of the bank regarding its choice of extending
intra-bank loans given the capital level Kt. As long as there is a spread between the intra-
bank loan rate and the policy rate the bank will supply loans to increase its profits. However,
this means that capital-to-asset ratio moves further away from the constant value νb which
implies costs, hence reducing the profits. These two driving forces are opposed to each other,
thus dragging the bank to choose the optimal level of loans that equates the marginal cost of
reducing the capital-asset-ratio to the policy-loan spread.
Retail Sector for Loans (The Loan Branch)
The retail banks have unit mass and compete under monopolistic competition with flexible
rates in the loan market for entrants. Bank j obtains loans bEj,t from the wholesale branch at
the rate iWt , and resells them to the entrants after differentiating them. As in La Croce and
Rossi (2018), banks are aware of the survival rate of the borrower, hence taking the probability
of firm exit δ into account. Then, bank j maximizes its profits by choosing the interest rate
iEj,t while facing a downward sloping demand schedule (1.25):
max
{iEj,t}
(1 + iEj,t)(1− δ)bEj,t − (1 + iWt )bEj,t














On the other hand we assume that the loan market for incumbents is perfectly competitive,
hence they have access to bank loans at a borrowing fee iIt that does not require a bank markup,





Note that δ enters into the expressions in such a way that larger exit rate yields higher loan
rates. Also, notice that banks can charge higher margins on the entrants because of their
monopolistic nature, while the incumbents are unaffected by the type of competition among
banks. In addition, θbt is stochastic hence allowing us to examine the influence of bank com-
petition variability on the economy through the entry channel. A positive shock to θbt reduces
the mark-up which implies fiercer competition between banks, while a negative shock increases
the mark-up and raises the bank concentration.
Finally, bank profits can be characterized by the following expression:
J bt = i
E
t (1− δ)bEt + iIt (1− δ)bIt − δBt − itDt − adjbt (1.33)
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1.2.4 Markets Clearing
The labor market clears when the supply of labor by the household equals the demand by both
the incumbents and entrants, hence:
Lt = LC,t + LE,t (1.34)
While the credit market clears when the following holds:
bIt + b
E
t = Bt (1.35)
Finally the goods market clearing condition is:
Ct = YC,t (1.36)
We also denote the total output (GDP) by Yt, which can be defined as the sum of the total
consumption and total investment:
Yt = YC,t + vtN
E
t (1.37)
1.2.5 Monetary Policy Rule






















We analyze the consequences of three types of shocks: TFP shock, bank capital shock, and
bank mark-up shock.






























where uA,t, uK,t and ub,t are all i.i.d. The summary of the model is inserted in Table 2.3.
1.2.7 The Steady States
We assume that productivity is constant at the steady state: At = A. We denote the long run
levels of the endogenous variables by dropping the time index t from their notations. We define





We also consider the steady state inflation rate to be π = 0, hence i = r.
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We first compute the steady state levels of the nominal interest rates on the loans. Since νb
represents the long run level of capital-to-loan ratio, i.e: K/B = νb, this implies that i
W = r












From the Euler equation for share holding (1.9) the gross return on investment in new varieties
becomes:






This captures the premium for expected firm destruction. Now we write the long run values
in terms of the steady state value of number of goods N . From the FOCs of the incumbent’s
problem (1.12) and (1.13), and from the variety effect equation (1.16) we compute the long run









































On the other hand, from the law of motion of the number of firms (1.23) we find that new



















Notice that the heterogeneity in the borrowing costs among the incumbents and the entrants
is reflected in the ratio 1+i
E
1+iI
which is included in the long run values of the variables.
From both technologies of creating consumption goods (1.19) and creating new firms (1.22),















(θ − 1)N (1.53)












At this stage we can compute the important long run ratios which are presented in Table
1.3. Compared to the benchmark model of BGM, all the expressions that characterize the long
run ratios are unchanged, except the share of labor income in GDP. The interest rates on firm
loans enter into the latter expression reducing the share of labor income in GDP compared to
the BGM counterpart. On the other hand, higher wedge between iE and iI -which is captured
by the ratio 1+i
E
1+iI
- implies larger share of incumbent loans in total loans and lower share for
entrants.
As stated earlier, the steady state expressions were in terms of N . However, substituting
the wage expression in the labor supply schedule (1.8), and by using (1.54) we solve for the total














Again, note that the presence of the borrowing costs iI and iE reduces the long run level of
total hours worked relative to its BGM counterpart.
After pinning down the value of L we can easily compute the steady state number of goods
N , and eventually for all the other variables.
1.3 Impulse Responses
1.3.1 Calibration
In the model, the periods are considered as quarters hence we set β = 0.99 which implies 4
percent annualized average interest rate. For the group of parameters θ, ϕ, δ and fE I follow the
standard calibration used by BGM. For the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate
goods I set θ = 3.8, and for the elasticity of labor supply I set ϕ = 4. For firm’s constant death
shock I set δ = 0.025 which implies 10 percent annual production destruction rate, something
that is in line with US empirical evidence and also with some European countries8. As for the
entry fee parameter fE I set it equal to one without loss of generality, as it does not affect the
impulse responses.
We assume that the regulatory required capital-asset ratio is 9%, thus we set K
B
= νb = 0.09
at steady state which implies a value η = 0.077 satisfying the requirement (the fixed share of
resources used to manage bank capital), while we choose κ = 10.82 which appears in the
adjustment cost of the wholesale branch as in Gerali et al. (2010). For the purpose of choosing
the steady state value of the elasticity of substitution between the bank loans that matches its
counterpart in Figure 1.3, I first calculate the sample mean of the ratio between the borrowing
costs of small and large loans, which serves as a proxy for the markup θ
b
θb−1 applied by the banks
on entrant loans (markup over the fee on the incumbent loans). The value of this sample mean
is 1.87 which corresponds to a value of θb = 2.15.
The steady state productivity level is set at A = 1. The persistence of the stochastic
AR(1) processes are ρA = 0.975, ρK = 0.9 and ρb = 0.9, while the standard deviations of the
8For example, the average annual destruction rate from 2008 to 2018 is 11.77% in the US, 8.95% in Spain,
and 11.07% in the UK.
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Figure 1.4: IRFs for 1% positive productivity shock.
shocks are set equal to 0.01. Finally, the Taylor rule parameters are: φr = 0.8, φπ = 1.75 and
φy = 0.125, values that are common in the literature.
1.3.2 Productivity Shock
To explore the consequences of entrant’s reliance on bank credit and the importance of the
diversity in borrowing costs, we compare the impulse responses of the baseline framework for
different levels of interest rate spreads to the model without bank finance and to the version
without spread. Figure 1.4 displays the impulse responses of the endogenous log-variables
to 1% productivity increase9. The solid lines represent the IRFs for the baseline model for
different spread levels, while the dotted line is for the model where entrants do not borrow
(non-borrowing case), and the dashed one is for the case where entrants borrow at the same
cost iIt as the incumbents (no-fragmentation case).
Productivity improvement generates higher profits expectations because of higher demand
for consumption goods. In addition, the decline in policy rate it yields to lower interest rate
on loans to incumbents iIt , hence a fall in production costs and a further increase in profits
and loans amount bIt . These positive impacts on profits attract firm creation till the entry
condition is met. However, since entrants rely on bank financing then entry cost depends on
the borrowing fee iEt which in turn declines in the policy rate. As a result entry cost drops on
impact, and to understand why, it is useful to write it in the following form:




(1 + iEt )
(1 + iIt )
µt ≡ fEStµt
9Simulations are constructed using Dynare.
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where we denoted the entry cost by cEt and used (1.12) to obtain the expression. Note that




captures the heterogeneity between the borrowing costs of incumbents
and entrants, hence is equal to 1 in the no-fragmentation case. Since Nt is a state variable
then marginal cost µt is unchanged on impact (through (1.13) and (1.16)), and the presence of
spread between the interest rates drives the ratio St down (i
E
t decreases more than i
I
t ), which
implies a fall in cEt in response to positive TFP shock. The drop in entry cost gives an additional
boost to the number of entrants which is absent in the non-borrowing and no-fragmentation
cases. Eventually, higher investment in new varieties is followed by higher levels of output on
impact. Meanwhile, the model demonstrates larger amplification for wider spreads (as shown
in the case where θb = 1.5).
Note that the number of firms Nt is pre-determined, therefore it starts to increase gradually.
In addition to the initial impact, the model exhibits more persistence compared to its other
counterparts. The higher persistence in number of entrants implies stronger rise in number of
firms but dampened dynamics of firm profits because of the fiercer firm competition, although
total profits remain above the steady state during the transition periods. Finally, the con-
sumption is hump-shaped because the household saves by reallocating its labor supply from
production of existing goods to variety creation as it becomes more attractive.
1.3.3 Bank Capital Shock
Figure 1.5 demonstrates the impulse responses of a negative bank capital shock. This can
represent negative financial shock that comes from the supply side of credit. Credit contraction
forces the banks to increase the loan interest rates, which in turn implies lower demand for
loans by both entrants and incumbents due to higher borrowing fees. Again, reduced profit
expectation -because of higher production costs- is not the only channel through which entry
shrinks but also through the higher entry costs as a consequence to the rise in St (since i
E
t
is more volatile than iIt ). The baseline model shows stronger negative response by entrants,
number of firms, GDP, and loan amounts relative to the non-borrowing and no-fragmentation
versions. As noticed, the recovery of the economy is delayed as a result of obstructing new
firm creation. Moreover, the model predicts a rise in the incumbent loan share in total loans,
combined with a fall in the entrant’s share.
1.3.4 Mark-up Shock
Figure 1.6 presents the IRFs for a positive shock on the bank mark-up (negative shock to the
substitutability between bank loans), where higher mark-up is interpreted as an increase in
bank concentration. In response, competition among monopolistic banks becomes weaker and
access to bank finance becomes more limited. Thus entrants are charged at higher rates for
their borrowing (a direct effect through equation (1.31)), which results in a decline in firm entry
rate and loan volumes due to the higher entry cost cEt , hence both investment in new varieties
and GDP fall despite of the initial rise in consumption, which is followed by a gradual decline
in the number of firms. The movements of iIt are purely related to policy rate’s dynamics since
bank competition does not directly affect the incumbents’ borrowing cost. The fall in it drags
down the loan rate iIt , therefore demands for loans and labor by incumbents increase although

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.6: IRFs for 1% positive bank mark-up shock
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1.4 The Model with Sticky Prices
In this section we extend the model to incorporate nominal rigidity, where incumbents face
price adjustment costs expressed in quadratic form (Rotemberg (1982)). The aim is to discuss
the cyclical behavior of firm entry as a consequence to expansionary monetary policy.
1.4.1 The Modified Equations
As in the baseline framework, firms are identical in equilibrium. We start by defining the





Incorporating this cost, goods market clearing becomes: YC,t = Ct + PACt, and is simplified














(θ − 1)(1− γ
2
π2t ) + γ
{








1.4.2 Expansionary Monetary Shock
The benchmark models in both Bilbiie et al. (2007) and Lewis (2009) imply counter-cyclical
response of firm entry in the face of expansionary monetary shock, which contracts evidence
provided by Bergin and Corsetti (2005) and Lewis (2006). To understand why, consider an
exogenous drop in policy rate that generates a boost in consumption and GDP, thus inflation
rises. Because of imperfect price adjustment price markup contracts, which in turn drives down
profits. These dynamics are accompanied by an increase in real wage (since nominal wages
are flexible but prices are sticky) which leads to a rise in the entry cost. On net, firm entry
drops. To overcome this contradiction against empirical observations, Bilbiie et al. (2007)
has proposed another definition for the sunk entry fee that does not depend on real wages,
while Lewis (2009) assumed wage rigidity to dampen the response of real wages and the rise
of entry cost. As a result, both mechanisms become predicting pro-cyclical dynamics of firm
entry in the face of expansionary monetary policy. However, our model provides another way
to overcome the counter-cyclical behavior of firm entry. As discussed earlier, the assumption
that entrants borrow to cover their initial set-up fees implies that entry cost depends on the
borrowing cost iEt which in turn is related to the policy rate because of the imperfect banking
system. The exogenous reduction in interest rate it yields to a decline in i
E
t as well (sharper
decline than iIt ), acting as an opposite force to the increase in real wage (entry fees) hence firm
entry rises on balance. Figure 1.7 illustrates the model dynamics in response to 1% negative
transitory shock to policy rate. Note that our model predicts positive co-movement between
consumption, output and firm entry, unlike the non-borrowing and no-fragmentation cases
where entry contracts on impact while consumption rises. In addition, higher spread in the
loan interest rates amplifies the response of the main variables.
10For simplicity we do not distinguish between consumption based inflation and producer price inflation. The
results would not change with that consideration too.
29






























Number of Firms N
t








Figure 1.7: IRFs for 1% transitory expansionary monetary shock
1.5 Other Entry Costs
Here we consider other entry fee expression which has also been utilized in the literature. This
robustness check will be applied in order to examine if the results achieved earlier are going to
change by altering the formula of the entry fee. In the baseline model we followed the definition
of entry condition as in BGM where the sunk cost equals the wages of constant fE units of
effective labor. However in the following set up we consider the fee needed to create a new firm
equals the value of constant fE units of consumption goods.
To cover the sunk cost, the entrant borrows from the bank an amount bEj,t = fE described
in real terms, with interests to be paid and the end of the period (after selling the shares to
the household). Entry occurs until firm value equals the total debt, which is highlighted by
the following entry condition:
vt = fE(1 + i
E
t ) (1.59)
Assuming YE,t to be the total amount of consumption goods needed to create all the new






While the total amount of loans bEt demanded by all the entrants is given by:
bEt = YE,t (1.61)
Moreover, goods and labor markets clearing conditions become:
YC,t = Ct + YE,t (1.62)
Lt = LC,t (1.63)
While the total output produced by the incumbents is given by the expression:
YC,t = ρtAtLC,t (1.64)
and the GDP coincides with total firm output:
Yt = YC,t (1.65)
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The rest of the model remains the same.
Figures 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 at the end of the chapter illustrate the comparison of the IRFs
for TFP, bank capital, and bank mark-up shocks respectively between the baseline model and
the model with constant entry fee in terms of consumption goods. We can summarize that
the dynamics are similar in both cases against all shocks, however the responses of the main
variables are stronger in the second case. This is because the cost of entry depends purely
on the borrowing fee iEt , while in the baseline version it depends on the real wage too, where
its procyclical fluctuations play a dampening role on the sunk cost. Entry, output, labor and
loans exhibit higher volatility and persistence when entry fee is defined in constant units of
consumption goods. Thus, we can conclude that the qualitative results are robust to the change
in entry fee definition.
1.6 Conclusion
Empirical observations suggest that firm entry is a vital transmission channel of shocks and that
start-ups indeed suffered the most during the latest financial crisis. Lenders are more inclined
to finance large and already established enterprises, hence potential entrants experience tougher
access to external funds because of the high uncertainty surrounding their creditworthiness,
which in turn leads to sharp dispersion in lending fees relative to other borrowers. This paper
has presented a DSGE model characterized by endogenous firm entry where both incumbents
and entrants depend on bank loans to cover their production and entry costs at different
rates. The model captures firm dynamics by emphasizing the importance of start-ups’ access
to outside debt in transmitting real, financial, and monetary shocks. Banks were modeled
in an imperfect fashion charging higher rates on start-up loans. The model implies stronger
amplification and persistence in response to all shocks, and higher volatility in entry and
output dynamics when the spread between interest rates gets wider. In line with evidence,
the model predicts slower recovery of the economy after credit contraction due to lower firm
entry rates, combined with a fall in the start-up loans’ share in total loans. Moreover, the
number of entrants decreases as a result of lower bank competition, which yields a decline
in the total number of firms. Finally, following an expansionary monetary shock the model
successfully implies positive co-movement between entry and consumption, a result that agrees
with empirical evidence. The findings were robust to change in entry fee definition.
The study is a step forward towards understanding the mechanisms by which the shocks
affect the economy through firm entry channel. As a next step, considering that start-ups
constitute an important sector in the economy, the model can be modified by embedding house
investment as well. The collapse of house prices combined with a fall in firm entry rates is an
observation that cannot be ignored during the last recession. Along these lines, house prices
emerge as an important factor when we think of the household as an investor in creating new
firms, as large portion of household’s borrowing is done through collateral against houses.
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Interpretation Equations
Labor supply wt = CtLt
1
ϕ



































Total labor Lt = LC,t + LE,t
Labor for production YC,t = ρtAtLC,t




Law of motion for the number of firms Nt = (1− δ)(Nt−1 +NEt−1)





Goods market clearing YC,t = Ct
GDP Yt = YC,t + vtN
E
t
Loans to incumbents bIt = wtLC,t
Loans to entrants bEt = wtLE,t









(1− η)Kt−1 + J bt−1
)
εKt
Balance sheet constraint Bt = Dt +Kt
Bank profits J bt = i
E
t (1− δ)bEt + iIt (1− δ)bIt − δBt − itDt − adjbt


















Interest rate on incumbents’ loans iIt =
iWt +δ
1−δ




























































Table 1.1: Model Summary
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Parameter Interpretation Value
β Household’s discount factor 0.99
θ Elasticity of substitution between goods 3.8
ϕ Elasticity of labor supply 4
δ Firm’s exit probability 0.025
fE Entrant’s sunk cost parameter 1
νb Long-run capital-loan ratio 0.09
κ Coefficient of adjustment cost of capital 10.82
θb Elasticity of substitution between bank loans 2.15
γ Coefficient of price adjustment cost 77
φr Taylor rule parameter 0.8
φπ Taylor rule parameter 1.75































































Ratio of bank capital to total loans K
B
= νb






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.10: IRFs for 1% positive bank mark-up shock.
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Chapter 2
Loan Defaults in Endogenous Firm
Entry Framework
2.1 Introduction
The years leading to 2008 financial crisis were characterized by a rise in house prices that
significantly led to increase in lending volumes. Households had easier access to bank loans
thanks to the higher collateral value of their houses. However, the burst in housing market
bubbles triggered a wave of loan defaults originated in the household sector and generated
losses in the banking sector, which in turn played a crucial role in amplifying the impact of
the shock on the economy due to its importance to the production sector as a credit supplier.
One of the consequences was a reduction in collateral value, business investment, and birth of
new firms. In fact, the business cycle patterns of default volumes and firm creation suggest the
presence of an important link between the two, thus understanding the interaction between
them during the crisis would further help to explain the role of the extensive margin activity
in the aggregate fluctuations. The aim of this work is to focus on the response of firm entry to
default and house demand shocks and to study its endogeneity as a transmission channel, in
addition to emphasizing the role of the investor’s financial constraint and the bank in amplifying
the default shock on the number of entrants.
I start by analyzing the cyclical behavior and the empirical patterns of some relevant time
series from US quarterly data, namely: establishment birth levels, loan defaults (charge-offs),
and house prices, covering the sample period from 1992:Q3 to 2019:Q4. Data on US business
formation are obtained from Bureau of Labor Statistics1 and are reported at the establishment
level 2. On the other hand, the loan charge-offs data are recorded by the Federal Reserve Board3,
while House Price Index (HPI) is provided by Federal Housing Finance Agency. Because we are
interested in the short run fluctuations I detrend the log-variables using HP filter4, a common
procedure that makes the series stationary since all these quantities grow in time, and for the
rest of the analysis I use the cyclical components after multiplying them by 100 to interpret
them as percentages. Figure 2.1 displays these cyclical components with their standerdized
counterparts, the latter is to get clearer visual insight about cyclical patterns and correlations.
The first row illustrates the procyclicality of firm entry (measured as establishment birth levels),
and that it is more volatile than GDP. In the second row, the negative comovement between
1The provided data on business formation start from 1992.
2They define the establishment as “an economic unit that produces goods or services, usually at a single
physical location, and engaged in one or predominantly one activity”. Therefore, although a firm can be a multi-
establishment enterprise, we will use the two terms “firm” and “establishment” interchangeably hereafter.
3I use data for household loans, and for all commercial banks.













































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.1: The cyclical components (reported in percentages) of HP filtered time series of the
log-variables, and their standerdized counterparts. US data, sample period from 1992:Q3 to
2019:Q4.
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The Cyclical Full sample Before financial crisis Build up, recession, and after
Components 1992:Q3-2019:Q4 1992:Q3-2005:Q4 2006:Q1-2019:Q4
Birth Levels (Entry)
Standard deviation 3.43% 3.07% 3.76%
Autocorrelation (1st order) 0.38 0.18 0.47
GDP
Standard deviation 1.01% 0.94% 1.09%
Correlation with Entry 0.56 0.31 0.73
Autocorrelation (1st order) 0.88 0.87 0.86
Consumption
Standard deviation 0.83% 0.75% 0.90%
Correlation with Entry 0.49 0.19 0.68
Autocorrelation (1st order) 0.91 0.88 0.91
Loan Charge-off
Standard deviation 27.95% 22.57% 32.49%
Correlation with Entry -0.50 -0.33 -0.60
Autocorrelation (1st order) 0.80 0.59 0.90
HPI
Standard deviation 2.31% 1.46% 2.89%
Correlation with Entry 0.41 0.40 0.42
Autocorrelation (1st order) 0.95 0.79 0.92
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics from US
entry and default volumes (charge-off) can be observed, the charge-off being much more volatile
than birth, while the last row shows that entry and house prices (HPI) comove positively. It
needs to be highlighted that these correlations got stronger and became more evident in the
years building up to the financial crisis, which suggests the increased role of their interaction’s
impact on real economy and business cycle.
In addition, Table 2.1 reports some useful statistics regarding unconditional moments based
on the entire sample and on a decomposition of two subsamples: the first one covers the pe-
riod before the Great Recession (1992:Q3-2005:Q4), while the second one covers the span that
contains the year building up to the crisis, the recession years, and the period that comes
after (2006:Q1-2019:Q4). The table documents that all variables expressed higher volatility
(measured by their standard deviation) in the second sub-sample. Additionally, it shows a
remarkable stylized fact: stronger procyclicality of entry (the increase in its correlation with
real GDP and consumption) in the period 2006-2019 and substantial increase in its negative
correlation with loan charge-off levels, meanwhile the positive correlation between entry and
HPI has also risen. Moreover, Figure 2.2 presents rolling window statistics from US quarterly
data of 12 years per sample (48 quarters). An important characteristic that emerges from this
figure is the increase in volatility and procyclicality of entry as the window rolls over time
approaching the crisis periods. Another striking pattern observed is the increase in correla-
tion of entry with both loan charge-off and HPI around 1994 as the sample starts to contain
quarters from the years leading to the Great Recession, while the strength of these correla-
tions peaks around 2000. This examination documents that changes in house prices and loan
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Figure 2.2: US statistics (rolling window 12 years). The analysis is done for the cyclical
components of the HP filtered time series.
default amounts impacted the birth of new firms before and during the Great Recession, with
increasing role of firm entry in aggregate fluctuations of economic activity. Furthermore, I
provide VAR evidence in the next section illustrating the positive response of entry, output,
and consumption to house price shock, and their negative reaction to loan default shock, which
eventually indicates that firm entry was significantly hit by financial shocks and became a non-
negligible source of amplification. Given the presented evidence and the direct link between
collateral value and house prices, the role of the endogeneity of the financial constraints cannot
be ignored in this story. Therefore, I develop a DSGE model that describes such interaction
between loan defaults, asset price variations, and firm creation, which is able to qualitatively
replicate the VAR results.
Many leading studies were devoted to understand the several transmission channels that
led to the sharp decline in economic activity, and variety of financial frictions were introduced
into the standard business cycle models. The default on debts by the borrowers was explicitly
modeled by Iacoviello (2015) to assess its repercussions on business fluctuations5. He argues
that defaults by a group of agents on its obligations lead to redistribution of wealth from
the productive sector of the economy to the unproductive one. This shock is at the core
of this study; such a shock transfers resources from savers to borrowers which would reduce
the former’s ability to lend, and will be reflected in the collapse of collateral value of the
constrained investor borrowers, thus discouraging them to invest specifically in new varieties
which is our main interest 6. Through the baseline model, I explain the mechanism of this
5In Iacoviello (2015) the number of firms is fixed.
6In the text I use the terms “new firm creation” and “new varieties” interchangeably.
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shock originated only from the unproductive borrower. Then I consider two distinct default
shocks in the extended model with bank: one triggered by the unproductive agent, the other
one by the investor borrower; a feature that allows us to compare the impacts of the shocks
based on their origin.
The baseline model I present in this paper is characterized by endogenous firm entry and
populated by three types of households who are heterogeneous across their patience levels:
one lender and two borrowers. The default shock -although exogenous in the model- can be
understood as a consequence to a sharp fall in house prices that makes the value of the house
stock lower than the debt value itself. Having no financial intermediate, the shock would affect
negatively the net worth of the lender who in turn decreases loan supply to the constrained
investor who is utilizing house as collateral. But since financial institutions are the primary
sources of credit supply to business investment, any loss that these suppliers suffer would have
more severe impact on the economy through the rise in borrowing costs. Therefore I extend the
model by incorporating a banking sector as a financial intermediate. Losses generated in the
banking sector would further amplify the adversity of the shock by increasing the lending cost
which is followed by a drop in the collateral value, hence constrained agents would experience
a decrease in the amount of extended loans that are necessary to finance their investment
activities. Moreover, I assign a weight to each type of agent in the economy which has non-
negligible influence on the size of the shock’s impact. The importance of the size that each
type of agent represents was investigated in the works by Bilbiie (2008) and Gaĺı et al. (2007),
where it had profound implications on monetary and fiscal policies. I also explore separately
the direct impact of a house price shock (house demand shock) on the value of the collateral
and the whole economy through firm creation. On top of that, I examine how variations in the
creditworthiness of an agent -captured by loan-to-value ratio- would magnify the amplification
mechanism.
The model distinguishes itself from previous works that incorporate financial frictions and
collateral through several dimensions. Most importantly, the model investigates the aftermath
of the above mentioned shocks on business activity through endogenous firm creation, and high-
lights the role of the collateral in business formation. It also gives us the advantage to track
the origin of the default surprise by identifying two different shocks: each one related to each
type of the borrower agents. It also explores the ramifications of having heterogeneous mass
of agents, an ingredient that to the best of my knowledge was ignored in the endogenous entry
literature. The main findings that the model delivers are: 1) In the baseline version, the lender
will suffer a loss in the face of a debt default by the unproductive borrower, which implies a
decline in loan supply. The other constrained agent experiences a drop in the value of her house
collateral inducing her to reduce investment in new varieties, and the overall decrease in total
demand of output will be amplified through the endogenous firm entry channel. In addition,
when the defaulter household’s weight in the economy is larger, the loss endured by the lender
becomes bigger, which leads to more reduction in entry. However in this case, the amplified im-
pact of the shock on output through endogenous entry is dampened. This is because defaulters
-who have higher propensity to consume- raise their demand for goods on impact, something
that partly increases profit expectations. As robustness exercises I also consider investment in
non-residential (commercial) houses, and another definition of firm entry. 2) In the extended
version, banks -acting as credit suppliers- have crucial role in magnifying and propagating the
financial shocks. Triggered by loan defaults, the losses suffered by the bank affect negatively
the decision on new firm investment which is transmitted to the entrepreneur through higher
borrowing cost and lower asset prices (house prices) implying tightened borrowing constraint.
3) The default shock when it is originated from the unproductive borrower implies larger con-
traction in entry and output than the one triggered by the investor borrower. 4) Positive house
demand shock directly affects the credit accessibility by improving the collateral value, which
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leads to higher investment in new firms. On top of that, fluctuations in creditworthiness of the
borrowers implies an amplified impact of both default and house demand shocks on firm entry.
This work belongs to the literature that sheds light on the importance of endogeneity
of firm entry as a transmission channel of shocks. The model developed by Bilbiie et al.
(2012) (henceforth BGM) has shown how the endogenous entry serves as a vital propagation
mechanism of business cycle fluctuations in the face of changes in aggregate productivity.
La Croce and Rossi (2018) studied how firm entry amplifies the adversity of financial shocks
on GDP through the incumbent firms who rely on bank loans to cover their operational costs,
where they face higher marginal costs in response to a credit crunch originated in an imperfect
banking system which yields lower expected profits and a reduction in the number of potential
entrants. Bergin et al. (2018) have studied the negative effects of a recession on firm entry
through its linkage to lower equity prices as a result of negative financial shock. Siemer (2016)
documented that the unprecedented contraction in the number of entrants between 2007 and
2010 was largely due to financial constraints and bank dependency, and was responsible for the
slow recovery of the economy. However, these studies did not incorporate housing market, the
importance of which was fundamental in the Great Recession. They also did not address the
role of endogeneity of investor household’s collateral constraint when facing credit deterioration.
More precisely, the contribution of this paper lies in the approach that aims to capture the
impact of loan default and house demand shocks on firm entry dynamics through the fall or rise
in constrained investor’s collateral value, which occurs due to fluctuations in borrowing cost
and asset prices. In addition, our model identifies the origin of the debt default hence is able to
distinguish the shock’s impact depending on the type of the defaulter household (unproductive
or investor), an element that was absent in those studies.
Endogeneity of asset prices that reflects on the collateral value of the borrower is a famil-
iar idea of a financial accelerator described in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Therefore if the
borrower is an investor entrepreneur, then investment volumes would shrink in a reaction to a
fall in home prices, given that loans are collateralized by houses. Many empirical studies have
explored the link between collateral constraints and entrepreneurial activities in firm creation.
Balasubramanyan and Coulson (2013) identified a causal link between house prices and the
amount of very small business starts by quantitatively modeling the interaction between them
from 2005 to 2009. Using variations in house prices as shocks to the value of collateral, Schmalz
et al. (2017) found that a rise in collateral value increases the probability to become an en-
trepreneur. Another documentation of the collateral lending role was done by Adelino et al.
(2015), showing that regions with a higher run up in house prices in the pre-crisis period wit-
nessed a significant increase in self-employment and small business starts. Similar observations
were made by Berggren et al. (2017) on startups across Sweden. The authors concluded that
the frequency of startups increases by 0.15% to a 1% increase in home prices. Moreover, Schott
(2015) has assessed the impact of house prices decline on the jobless recovery in US through
the low number of new firms. Having said that, it is not surprising that the recession -which
was initiated by sharp decline in house prices and followed by volumes of loan defaults that
were originated in the household sector- affected entry and was amplified due to endogenous
firm creation. In light of the presented evidences -including the VAR results- and the studies
reviewed so far, I consider the model in this work a relevant theoretical framework that is
successfully able to predict the dynamics of firm entry in the face of default and house demand
shocks as well as highlighting the role of its endogeneity as a vital transmission channel, and
to demonstrate the role of the bank and collateral value in the contraction or expansion of
business formation.
The paper is organized in the following way: Section 2.2 provides empirical motivation by
running Structural-VAR model, 2.3 outlines the theoretical model with its baseline version to
demonstrate the implications of loan default surprise, section 2.4 presents robustness exercises,
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section 2.5 extends the model to assess the bank sector’s role, section 2.6 reports the second
moments delivered by the model, and section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Motivation
In this section I present the estimates of impulse response functions (IRFs) of some key variables
to house price and default shocks by running Structural Vector Auto Regressive (SVAR) model
in order to provide further empirical motivation. I consider the detrended7 time series from
US data with a sample that covers the period from 1992:Q3 to 2019:Q4 in the following order:
House Price Index (HPIt), Loan Charge Offs (CHRGt), Real Consumption (Ct), Birth levels
of Establishments (NEt), and Real Gross Domestic Product (GDPt). Ordering HPIt first
and CHRGt second is based on Cholesky decomposition that allows house price and default
shocks to be the most exogenous ones8. As a common practice given that the work is done
with quarterly data, I choose the lag length to be 4. I report the IRFs in Figures 2.3 and 2.4
along with 90% bootstrapped confidence bands.
The analysis suggests that the theoretical model has to deliver the following interactions:
1) Positive reaction of consumption, firm entry, and total output in response to house price
shock, in addition to drop in loan charge off volumes.
2) In the face of default surprise, reduction in consumption, birth levels, GDP, and a fall
in asset prices.
In the rest of the chapter I develop a DSGE model that matches the qualitative results of
the SVAR model, then I compare the generated second moments of some key variables with
their data counterparts.
2.3 The Baseline Model
The economy in the baseline model is populated by three types of households: patient lender,
“unproductive” impatient borrower, and impatient investor (entrepreneur)9. The patience of
each agent is reflected in their perspective of the future and captured by the discount factors.
The patient type is a lender, the impatient one is a borrower, while the entrepreneur is a
borrower who invests in new varieties (firm creation). All the agents invest in residential
houses, and the borrowers use them as collateral to get loans. Improvement in the endogenous
value of the collateral would encourage consumption and investment by the entrepreneur, an
idea that can be traced back to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005). However in
those papers, investment was meant to be in land and houses. Here, we examine the channel
between the boost in collateral value and the expansion in new firm investment. On the
other hand, the production sector is characterized by endogenous firm entry as in BGM. This
configuration allows us to assess the consequences of loan defaults on economic activity through
the extensive margin.
For the sake of simplification, we identify just one exogenous loan default shock that hits
the budget constraints of only the patient and impatient households, in a way that reallocates
wealth from the lender to the unproductive borrower. Then in the extended version of the
model we consider another default shock that is triggered by the investor borrower as well. To
get an intuition of the transmission mechanism of such a financial shock, suppose the value
7I use the cyclical components introduced in the previous section. Other filtering or detrending techniques
such as taking the first-differences do not sensibly alter the results.
8The order of the remaining variables does not affect the results substantially.








































































Figure 2.4: IRFs to default (CHRG) shock in the SVAR model.
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of the collateral -in this case houses- drops below the value of the debt, for some exogenous
reasons that induce a sharp fall in home prices. Consequently, the borrower agent defaults on
their contractual obligations, and the lender suffers a sudden loss because of the anticipated
repayments are not met. Since the lender is considered to be a productive agent who finances
the entrepreneur, who in turn invests in new varieties, then credit supply falls and firm entry
drops. This happens because the accessibility of the investor agents -who borrow against their
houses- to the credit market will be affected adversely as a result of asset price fall, hence
a decrease in their collateral value. On the other hand the presence of banks as financial
intermediaries (to be seen in the extended version of the model) will further amplify that
impact on investment and output through the rise in lending costs.
In the upcoming subsections we present each agent’s problem and the associated optimal
conditions10. We assign a mass αP to the patient (lender) type, a mass αI to the impatient
household, and a mass αE to the entrepreneur, such that the total mass of households is set to
one, hence: αP +αI +αE = 1. Also, let βP , βI , and βE be the discount factors for the patient,
impatient, and investor households respectively, such that βP > βI and βP > βE, necessary
assumptions to guarantee that the impatient types borrow in equilibrium.
2.3.1 Patient Household
A representative patient household consumes, works, lends, and invests in residential houses.















































The patient household is subject to the following budget constraint in real terms:
CPt +Dt + qt(h
P




Dt represents desired loans supplied by the patient household to the two impatient households,
while Rt denotes the gross returns on those loans. L
P
t is labor supply by the patient household
to incumbent firms and wt is the real wage. h
P
t is the amount of residential house stock that
she wants to buy, while qt is the house price.
Lastly, εIt is the loan default shock that hits the income side of the lender (patient) household
negatively when house price falls below the value of the debt owed, hence this shock appears
10A superscript P , I or E is indexed to the variables associated with each type of household.
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as a positive term simultaneously in the income side of the unproductive impatient borrower,
and follows an AR(1) process:
εIt = ρεε
I
t−1 + uεI ,t (2.6)
Note that the coefficient of the default shock is a function of the shares of the household types,
therefore the size of each share affects the shock’s impact on the patient household. In fact,
the larger is the size of impatient type αI , the larger is the impact.



























t and the first order conditions are:






























expectation operator, and ΛPt,t+1 ≡ βP
CPt
CPt+1
is patient household’s consumption based discount
factor. Equation (2.8) represents the consumption Euler equation, (2.9) is the labor supply,
while (2.10) is demand for houses.
2.3.2 Impatient Household: The “Unproductive” Borrower
A representative impatient household consumes, works, borrows, invests in residential houses
and uses them as collateral, hence he maximizes the following expected utility:











































t − hIt−1) ≤ wtLIt +BIt + εIt (2.14)
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There is a limit on the amount that the impatient household can borrow, hence he is also









BIt represents the amount of loans demanded by the impatient household, and h
I
t is the amount
of residential house stock that he wants to buy. Note that the stock of house is utilized as
collateral, and the due debt (the borrowing amount with interest) cannot exceed a certain
fraction of the expected value of the houses owned by the impatient household in the current
period, therefore m can be defined as the loan-to-value ratio.
As discussed earlier, εIt shows up as a positive term in the right side of the impatient house-
hold’s budget constraint. The rationale is that when house price falls sharply, then default
becomes the preferred option for the borrower, the repercussion of which is a redistribution of
wealth from the productive sector (lender household) to the unproductive sector (the unpro-
ductive borrower household). Finally, LIt is labor supply by the impatient household to the
incumbent firms.

































t , and the first order conditions are:





































where λIt and µ
I
t are the Lagrange multipliers in period t attached to the budget and borrowing
constraints respectively, and ΛIt,t+1 ≡ βI
CIt
CIt+1
is impatient household’s consumption based dis-
count factor. Equation (2.17) represents the impatient household’s labor supply, while (2.19)
is the demand for houses.
Our assumption that βP > βI would ensure that in equilibrium there will be flow of loans.





) > 0, which
indicates that the borrowing constraint holds in equality.
















The fact that houses can be used as collateral is reflected in the last term of the house valuation
in the above equation, a term which is strictly positive in steady state since βP > βI .
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2.3.3 Impatient Investor: The Entrepreneur
A representative entrepreneur consumes, works, borrows, owns the firms and invests in new
varieties (buys shares and receives dividends), invests in residential houses and uses them as












































t − hEt−1) + vt(Nt +NEt )xt+1 ≤ wtLEt +BEt + (dt + vt)Ntxt (2.24)









BEt represents the amount of loans demanded by the entrepreneur, and h
E
t is the stock of
residential house that she owns. Similar to the other borrower, house is used as collateral,
where the repayment amount does not exceed a certain fraction of next period’s expected
value of the current stock of houses.
As in BGM the household buys equity shares from both producing firms (incumbents) and
start up firms (entrants). xt represents the share invested in the firms by the household, vt is
firm’s real value of share, Nt is the number of operating firms, N
E
t is the number of new entries
(or number of new varieties) and dt is the real dividends received from each incumbent.

































t , xt+1, and the first order conditions
are:
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where λEt and µ
E
t are the Lagrange multipliers in period t corresponding to the budget and





is entrepreneur household’s consump-
tion based discount factor. Equation (2.27) represents the investor household’s labor supply,
(2.29) is the demand for houses, while (2.30) is the Euler equation for share holding. To get
(2.30) we used the law of motion of the number of firms: Nt+1 = (1− δ)(Nt +NEt ), where δ is
the fraction of existing firms that exits the market ((1 − δ) is the survival rate). From (2.30)





This expression indicates that firm’s current value (both for entrants and incumbents) is equal
to the expected future stream of profits, as both types face the same survival rate and tech-
nology in the subsequent periods.
The impatience of the investor can be reflected in her discount factor by setting βB > βE,
suggesting that the borrowing constraint holds in equality, since equation (2.28) at the steady





















2.3.4 Incumbents (Operating Firms)
There is a continuum of incumbents located on a segment with mass Nt. They produce dif-
ferentiated consumption goods under monopolistic competition in a flexible price setting using
only labor, with substitutability between goods θ > 1. Firm i maximizes each period’s real
profits by choosing labor Li,t and the price of the good Pi,t using the technology Yi,t = ALi,t,
whereas the productivity A is common among the firms.






where Yt is the total consumption output and Pt is the price index.
Let mci,t be the real marginal cost that faces the incumbent, and the Lagrangian associated













Hence, the first order conditions are:











where equation (2.35) represents the relative price that firm i chooses at period t.












11One can formulate this by introducing final good producers operating in perfectly competitive market.
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where we denoted ρt ≡ Pi,tPt to the relative price. Note that Nt enters the equations describing
the final output and relative price, where the latter formulation reflects consumer’s love for
variety. Symmetry among the operating firms also yields to the following total labor demand:
Lt = NtLi,t (2.39)













In order to understand and be able to distinguish between the extensive and intensive
margins in the total economic activity, it is useful to rewrite (2.40) in slightly different manner
by means of (2.37) and (2.38):
Yt = Ntρtyt (2.42)
where yt ≡ Yi,t is the firm level output. Note that the dynamics of Nt (number of firms)
is responsible for the variations in aggregate output Yt through its extensive margin, while
variations through the intensive margin can be captured by ρtyt.
2.3.5 Entrants (The Creation of New Varieties)
At the start of each period a prospective entrant faces a fixed sunk entry cost equals to the
value of fE units of consumption goods. The entrant computes the value of the new variety




New entrants start to produce next period allowing a one period time to build lag in the
model. We assume δ ∈ (0, 1) to be a death shock that hits all firms of both types at the end
of each period, which causes a constant fraction δ of the existing firms to exit the market,
implying the following law of motion for the operating number of firms in the economy:
Nt = (1− δ)(Nt−1 +NEt−1) (2.44)
2.3.6 Markets Clearing









In addition, by considering fixed supply of houses, the clearing of house market is described
through the following equation:
αPhPt + α
IhIt + α
EhEt = 1 (2.47)
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t = Yt (2.51)
Note that total consumption Ct ≡ αPCPt +αICIt +αECEt when added to the amount of goods
devoted to new firm creation equals to the total output (GDP).
2.3.7 Calibration and Steady State Characteristics
The periods in the model are meant to be quarters, hence I set βP = 0.9925, which ensures
approximately 4% annual interest rate, similar to most of the works in the literature. Therefore,





On the other hand, from Euler equation of share holding (2.30) the steady state expression of
return to investment in new varieties can be obtained:












This allows us -by using the equations of firm profits (2.41), law of motion for the number of
firms (2.44), and goods market clearing (2.51)- to calculate some important long run rations
that can be found in Table 2.5.
In addition, by setting βI = 0.94 and βE = 0.94 we ensure that the impatient households
borrow in equilibrium. This can be seen immediately by evaluating (2.18) and (2.28) in steady
state where µI > 0 and µE > 0 are satisfied, as long as βI < βP and βE < βP . The parameter
associated with marginal utility of housing is set at j = 0.075 and the loan-to-value ratio at
m = 0.7. A value θ = 6 for the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate goods
delivers a price markup of 20%, which is commonly used in the literature12. Following Bilbiie
et al. (2012), for the elasticity of labor supply I set ϕ = 4, and firm’s constant death shock
δ = 0.025 which implies 10 percent annual firm destruction rate, something that is in line
with US empirical evidence. As for the parameter of entry cost fE, it can be set equal to one
without loss of generality, as it does not affect the impulse responses.
The steady state productivity level is set to A = 1, and the persistence of the stochastic
AR(1) process is ρε = 0.975, while the standard deviation of the shock is set equal to 0.01.
12Lower value such as θ = 4 as in Bilbiie et al. (2012) does not alter the qualitative conclusions.
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Figure 2.5: IRFs for 1% positive loan default shock εIt . Comparison between baseline model
and its counterpart with exogenous number of firms (αP = αI = αE = 1/3).
2.3.8 Loan Default Shock: The Role of Endogenous Entry
Figure 2.5 illustrates the comparison of impulse responses of key variables in percentage de-
viations from their steady state levels to 1% positive loan default shock by the unproductive
household between the baseline model and the model with exogenous number of firms13, for
a case when the agents have equal weights in the economy: αP = αI = αE = 1/3. The goal
is to assess the macroeconomic consequences of persistent losses in the productive sector on
firm entry and total output. When the impatient household defaults on his contractual obli-
gations because of, say, sharp decline in house prices or any other exogenous event, a transfer
of wealth occurs from the lender to the impatient borrower household, and in this case driving
away resources from the productive sector, since the patient household is the credit supplier to
the entrepreneur. Although the lending cost (return to deposits)14 drops on impact it remains
above steady state during the transition periods, which drives down asset prices qt that are used
as collateral for loans. Remarkably, this response matches the result implied by the presented
SVAR model following default shock. The fall in home prices deteriorates the collateral value
of the investor borrower which reduces her borrowings BEt and her consumption levels. How-
ever, her consumption does not drop as it does in a model without investment in new varieties.
Through the Euler equation for share holding (2.30), the entrepreneur is able to allocate part










where the hatted variables represent the percentage deviations from the steady state values.
The equation indicates that expected profits have negative impact on today’s consumption. The
anticipated fall in overall demand drives down the expected profits which makes the market
13Simulations are done using Dynare.
14The lending cost and the return to deposits are different variables in the extended model where the bank
sector is introduced.
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Figure 2.6: IRFs for 1% positive loan default shock εIt . Comparison between two different set
of values for the agents’ masses.
less attractive for potential entrants. In other words, the entrepreneur has less incentive to
invest in firm creation, therefore firm entry drops, and the decline in her consumption is muted
relative to the model with fixed number of firms. Although aggregate consumption rises slightly
on impact it remains below steady state afterwards. The initial rise is the result of impatient
borrower’s higher marginal propensity to consume, since the shock has positive income effect
on his budget constraint.
Finally, the initial drop in the intensive margin drives down total output (since Nt is prede-
termined), and the negative impact of the shock is amplified compared to the model with fixed
number of firms due to the procyclical response of business formation NEt . Later, it can be no-
ticed that the recovery of the intensive margin is relatively quicker than the aggregate output’s
due to the contribution of the extensive margin in output’s dynamics that is captured by the
gradual decrease in number of operating firms Nt which delays the recovery of the economy
(see equation (2.42)).
2.3.9 Loan Default Shock: The Role of Agents’ Masses
Now we address the importance of the size of each household type. For this purpose, we
compare the impulse responses to the default shock εIt considering two different levels for the
masses in the baseline model. Figure 2.6 shows how the model exhibits stronger decline in
entry and output when value for αI gets higher. To understand why, suppose each borrower
household in the segment with mass αI defaults on his loan that generates 1 dollar gain in his
budget constraint (2.14), then each lender household in the segment with mass αP incurs an
amount of loss equal to α
I
αP
dollars in her budget constraint (2.5), an expression that is strictly
increasing in αI since αP +αI +αE = 1, hence larger adverse impact on the productive sector.
However, given the value of each mass, the amplification through endogenous entry gets
weaker if αI is bigger. In figure 2.7 we display the dynamics of some key variables in the face
of 1% default shock εIt for two different sets of values for the shares, comparing the baseline
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Figure 2.7: IRFs for 1% positive loan default shock εIt . The role of endogenous entry for two
different set of values for the agents’ masses.
model’s behavior against its counterpart with fixed number of firms. The first row shows
the case when αI is relatively high, while the second row presents the other case when αI is
low. Although endogenous entry magnifies this type of financial shock in both cases, however
the amplification is muted in the first case. Notice that the drop in output is almost two
times amplified in the first case, while it is more than three times in the second case. This
is because one of the consequences of the redistribution shock is a positive wealth effect on
the defaulter household who has higher propensity to consume, and if this type of household
represents relatively large section in the economy then it would result in non-negligible rise in
goods demand, which in turn raises profits expectations that attract new firm creation, partly
offsetting the overall negative impact on entry and output.
2.4 Robustness Check
2.4.1 Entry in Labor Units
In this exercise we define firm entry in terms of effective labor units as in the original paper
by Bilbiie et al. (2012). A potential entrant faces a fixed sunk cost that equals to the hiring
cost (wages) of constant fEL units of effective labor. The entrant computes the value of the
new variety (the value of the new created firm) according to (2.31), and entry occurs until the







In the current setting the entrepreneur household supplies two types of labor: one for
production sector LEct , and one for business formation L
Ee
t , hence the investor’s labor is being













Finally, the produced goods are consumed entirely, unlike the assumption in the baseline
model where the produced goods were allocated between consumption and entry. Therefore,
Walras’ law implies that the goods market clears when total consumption equals output:
αPCPt + α
ICIt + α
ECEt = Yt (2.59)
Therefore, GDP can be defined as the sum of total consumption output and new varieties
created:
GDPt ≡ Yt + vtNEt (2.60)
Figure 2.8 demonstrates the impulse responses to loan default εIt for two versions of en-
try definitions: entry in terms of consumption goods, and entry in terms of labor units. The
dynamics are similar in the two settings, in the sense that the investor household decides to
dampen the fall in consumption in the expense of investment in new varieties. However, the
channel is different through which the allocation between investment and other expenditures is
performed. In this exercise where entry is defined in terms of effective labor, the entrepreneur
decides on impact to reduce the supply of labor to the less attractive economy (the extensive
margin) since profits are expected to be low, while increasing the supply of labor to the pro-
duction sector (the intensive margin). As a result, firm entry drops and output falls, followed
by gradual decrease in number of firms.
Compared to the baseline definition of entry (in terms of goods), the magnitudes of the
contraction of entry and output are slightly muted in this exercise, which can be attributed to
the way entry condition is defined in (2.56). Note that the sunk cost depends on wages that
decreases gradually, an outcome that favors firm entry, unlike the baseline definition where
the firm value -which coincides with the sunk cost in equilibrium- is constant. However, the
amplification is still present compared to the fixed firms version.
2.4.2 Commercial Houses
In addition to residential house investment, it is worth considering the commercial (non-
residential) stock of houses for the sake of robustness check. The investor household invests
in commercial houses as well, that are available for incumbents to rent for their production
purposes while paying rental costs to the entrepreneur for this type of house services. The
household does not get utility from commercial houses since she does not live in them (non
owner-occupied houses). Through this consideration the model is modified in several dimen-
sions which is left to be presented in the Appendix.
Figure 2.9 shows the role of endogenous firm entry in the presence of commercial house
investment in response to positive default shock εIt , and demonstrates that the qualitative
results achieved so far are unchanged.
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Figure 2.8: IRFs for 1% positive loan default shock εIt . Comparison between two entry defini-
tions (αP = αI = αE = 1/3).
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Figure 2.9: IRFs for 1% positive loan default shock εIt . The role of endogenous entry in the
presence of commercial houses (αP = αI = αE = 1/3).
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2.5 The Extended Model
In this section, I address the role of financial intermediaries in the transmission of two types
of default shocks (triggered by the two distinct borrowers) by introducing a banker agent to
the model. The latter demands deposits from the patient household and extends loans to the
other two borrower agents15. The presence of bank in the model is to make it more realistic,
and as a financial intermediate it plays an important amplifying role of financial shocks, some-
thing that will be shown below. Hence, the current variant of the model includes banker and
three household agents: the patient lender, the impatient borrower, and the impatient investor
(entrepreneur), while their discount factors respectively are: βB, βP , βI and βE, with assigned
values that justify each agent’s level of patience. In addition, the shares of the agents in the
economy are: αB, αP , αI and αE, that satisfy: αP + αI + αE + αB = 1 since the total mass
is normalized to unity. The default shock triggered by the investor borrower εEt is modeled
similarly to the one set off by the unproductive agent εIt . Compared to the baseline model, the
problems of the household agents are unchanged apart from the borrowing cost which will be
deviated from the deposit return creating a spread between the two rates. In the following I
present the bank sector16, and I leave the complete equations of the full model to the Appendix.
2.5.1 The Bank Sector
Due to loan defaults, how does the redistribution of resources work? In this block I present the
bank sector as a financial intermediate between the lender and the borrower households. In the
current setting, the redistribution shocks εIt and ε
E
t appear as negative terms in the banker’s
problem instead of the patient household’s, which implies that a loan default originated in the
borrower household’s sector triggers a loss in the net worth of the banker, which in turn affects
the entrepreneurial activities negatively given that the investor household depends on bank
loans to finance expenditures.








Similar to the problems of the households, CBt is basket of consumption goods produced by






















As in Iacoviello (2015) the banker is characterized to be an impatient agent relative to
the lender household, but a patient one when dealing with a borrower agent. This can be
guaranteed by choosing proper values for the discount factors. In fact, they should satisfy the
following: βI < βB < βP and βE < βB < βP .
15It is also possible to add the channel where banks extend loans to the incumbents as well, who borrow in
order to cover their productions costs. Therefore fluctuations, say rise, in the borrowing cost reduce profits
expectation which in turn attracts less entrants. See La Croce and Rossi (2018) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006)
16The superscript B is used for the variables associated with the banker.
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Let DBt denotes the amount of deposits that bank collects from the patient household, with
Rt to be the borrowing cost that is determined from the patient household’s problem. Also,
let BBt be the total amount of bank loans supplied to the two impatient households, while R
B
t
is its gross return.












The banker is also subject to a borrowing constraint in the form of regulatory commitments.
We assume that the amount of liabilities issued cannot exceed a certain fraction of the amount
of assets17:
DBt ≤ mBBBt (2.65)
The right hand side represents the fraction of the assets utilized as collateral.






























t , and the first order conditions are:


















where λBt and µ
B
t are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the budget and borrowing con-
straints respectively, and ΛBt,t+1 ≡ βB
CBt
CBt+1
is banker’s consumption based discount factor.








Furthermore when mB < 1, it is obvious from (2.67) and (2.68) that loans and deposits
returns are not equal in equilibrium. Moreover, lower values of mB make loans less liquid,
hence more compensation for the banker is needed, which is reflected in higher returns for
loans RBt . Having said that, by adjustment of the loan returns, these two equations summarize
the indifference behavior of the bank between collecting deposits and issuing loans.
2.5.2 Markets Clearing






On the other hand, the labor and house markets clear in a similar way to the baseline version









EhEt = 1 (2.72)
Finally, by imposing xt = xt+1 =
1
αE
in equilibrium, we write the budget constraints of the
four agents -patient, impatient, entrepreneur, banker- respectively:
CPt +Dt + qt(h
P




















































t = Yt (2.77)
2.5.3 Calibration and Steady State Properties
Before examining the role of the bank as a financial intermediate we have to ensure that the
banker is a borrower relative to the patient household, and a lender when dealing with the
impatient households. This can be done by choosing a value for the discount factor βB = 0.945
that satisfies the following: βI < βB < βP and βE < βB < βP . Accordingly, the borrowing
constraint (2.65) holds in equality, as well as the collateral constraints of the two impatient
households.
By evaluating equations (2.67) and (2.68) at steady state and using (2.52) we pin down the
value of loan returns:






Note that, by having mB < 1 and βB < βP , there is positive spread in steady state between
return on loans and cost of deposits R = 1
βP
, in fact:





2.5.4 Loan Default Shocks
Motivated by the fact that banks have played a crucial role in transmitting and magnifying the
deterioration of the financial system during the recent crisis, we explore how the transmission
mechanism of the financial shock that is triggered by loan defaults in the household sector
works, and how it impacts firm entry by tightening the financial constraint of the investor
borrower.
We start by demonstrating the dynamic equation of the spread by combining (2.67) with
(2.68):






This equation indicates that higher multiplier µBt reflects higher returns on loans, because
banks would require larger compensations on the extended loans when borrowing constraint
gets tighter. Moreover, a shock such as the loan default εIt or ε
E
t that causes losses of, say x
dollars, in the net worth of the bank (assets minus liabilities) implies a decline of x
1−mB > x









































































































































































































































Figure 2.10: IRFs for 1% positive loan default shock εIt . Displaying the role of the bank.
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Default by the Unproductive Borrower: The Role of the Bank
I highlight the importance of bank’s presence in the model by displaying the impulse responses
of some key variables to default shock εIt in Figure 2.10 based on the extended and the baseline
versions of the model18.
The redistribution shock diminishes the net worth of the bank, who reacts by reducing loan
supply. If the entrepreneur depends on bank loans to finance her expenditures, then such losses
in the bank sector will be transmitted to her through higher borrowing costs in equilibrium,
which directly reduces the demand for loans. Furthermore, this will have a drag on dampening
effect on house prices, which according to (2.32) depends negatively on future borrowing costs
that are expected to be above steady state for most of the transition, consequently house price
falls, hence further reducing the borrowing amount by deteriorating the collateral value that
dictates the limit of the entrepreneur’s borrowing ability. As a result, the entrepreneur reduces
consumption and investment triggering contraction in the number of entrants which increases
the negative impact on output, followed by gradual decline in total number of firms in the
subsequent periods.
Note that the version without banks have similar dynamics but are less volatile. In such
scenario the patient household lends directly to the borrowers, absent any spread between
deposit and loan returns. In the no-bank version, the lending cost Rt is determined by patient
household’s consumption pattern, and remains above the steady state for most of the periods,
but it does not rise as its counterpart RBt does in the full model. Therefore, house price and
loan volumes fall less sharply, and the drop in entry is muted.
Default by the Investor Borrower: The Role of the Shock’s Origin
Now we analyze the consequences of loan default εEt triggered by the investor borrower. The
unfavourable impact on the bank sector is similar to the one provoked by εIt (default originated
from the unproductive borrower). However εEt reallocates resources from the banker to the
entrepreneur, thus dampening the negative effect on investment created by the rise in borrowing
costs. This result can be noted in Figure 2.11, which displays the dynamics in response to the
two default shocks, and shows that redistribution of wealth caused by εEt generates muted
contraction in consumption, entry, and output compared to εIt . The initial rise in investor’s
consumption is because of her higher propensity to consume, but the eventual deterioration
in her collateral value and the decline in aggregate demand force her to decrease investment
activities. On the other hand Figure 2.12 demonstrates the amplifying role of endogenous entry
in the face of the default shock εEt .
2.5.5 House Demand Shock
Given the importance of houses as assets that can also be used as collateral to obtain loans,
particularly in the build up to the financial crisis, we are interested in assessing the model’s
performance in capturing the impact of house price variations on the economy through en-
try channel. To achieve this, I replace the parameter j by an AR(1) process jt which allows
us to capture exogenous disturbances to marginal utility of housing that shift the house de-
mand. Let’s also assume that such random variations of house prices are common among all
households, hence a shock to jt can be called house demand, house price or house preference
18For the upcoming exercises, the values of the agents’ shares are equal in each version: αP = αI = αE = 1/3
in the baseline version, and αP = αI = αE = αB = 1/4 in the extended one. However, the model implies
similar qualitative results for other combination of mass values as well.
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Figure 2.11: IRFs for 1% positive loan default shock εIt and ε
E
t . The Role of the Shock’s Origin.
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Figure 2.12: IRFs for 1% positive loan default shock εEt . The role of endogenous entry.
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Figure 2.13: IRFs for 1% positive house demand shock. Comparison between the extended











where uj,t is i.i.d.
Figure 2.13 plots the dynamic simulation of the model in the face of house demand shock
to jt. Assume 1% unexpected positive increase in house preference that can be understood
as an improvement or easing in regulations. Not surprisingly, this implies a jump in house
prices that directly has an influence in boosting lending conditions since the borrowers are
constrained amid utilizing their houses as collateral. The anticipated enhancements in credit
access would bolster profit expectations, and the intertemporal substitution logic drives the
investor household to postpone consumption in favor of investment in new varieties. Hence
firm entry rises followed by gradual increase in the number of firms. The dynamics in this
framework are evident compared with its counterpart with fixed number of firms where the
impact is mitigated in total output, concluding that the positive response of economic activity
to house preference shock is amplified through firm endogenous entry.
2.5.6 More on the Role of the Collateral
In order to further explore the role of the collateral as an amplification mechanism, it is worth
comparing the impulse responses to the default and house demand shocks between two different
values for loan-to-value ratiom in each case. Relatively higher values for this parameter indicate
easier requirements to obtain credit. Although having similar dynamics, Figures 2.14, 2.15,
and 2.16 show how more relaxed financial constraint (m = 0.75) implies higher volatility, where
the impacts of the shocks are larger in magnitude on firm entry and output. Since the borrower
investor is constrained, tighter conditions -reflected in lower values for m (m = 0.7)- would
have more muted repercussions on entry, output and total number of firms.
64
























Number of Firms N
t




















Loans (impatient) B I
t









Figure 2.14: IRFs for 1% positive loan default shock εIt .
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Figure 2.15: IRFs for 1% positive loan default shock εEt .
65

























Number of Firms N
t





















Loans (impatient) B I
t









Figure 2.16: IRFs for 1% positive house demand shock.
2.6 Second Moments
Table 2.2 reports the comparison of some relevant second moments between the ones observed
in the US data and the ones generated by the model. I compute the model implied second
moments for the HP-filtered log-variables XRt defined as




reported in the last two columns correspond to the baseline and the extended versions of the
model in the presence of default and house demand shocks with standard deviation of 1% each.
Remarkably, the extended model produces higher volatilities of output, consumption, entry,
and house price compared to the baseline version although they still fall short of the ones seen
in data. However, to examine the performance of the model relative to data it is better looking
into the ratio of a variable’s standard deviation to GDP’s rather than its magnitude, since the
standard deviations of the shocks are choices rather than estimates. Having said that, those
ratios implied by the extended version are quite close to their data counterparts. On the other
hand, the extended version predicts the procyclicality of consumption, entry, and house price
although producing high levels of correlations with GDP and entry, but yet relatively closer
to data than in the baseline version. Finally, the extended version outperforms the baseline
model when it comes to the persistency of consumption, while it generates relatively lower first
order autocorrelations for output and house price, but predicts larger number in case of entry.
19Following BGM, this consideration for the real variables is more consistent with the data since Pi,t is closer
to CPI index than Pt.
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Variable X Full Sample Baseline Extended
1992:Q3-2019:Q4 Model Model
GDP Y R
Standard deviation: σY R 1.01% 0.06% 0.41%
Autocorrelation (1st order) 0.88 0.77 0.74
Consumption CR
Standard deviation: σX 0.83% 0.03% 0.36%
Ratio of std. deviation to GDP’s: σX/σY R 0.81 0.50 0.88
Correlation with GDP 0.87 0.46 0.99
Correlation with Entry 0.49 0.05 0.90
Autocorrelation (1st order) 0.91 0.57 0.72
Entry NE
Standard deviation: σX 3.43% 1.11% 1.56%
Ratio of std. deviation to GDP’s: σX/σY R 3.38 18.5 3.81
Correlation with GDP 0.56 0.91 0.93
Autocorrelation (1st order) 0.38 0.58 0.82
House Price qR
Standard deviation: σX 2.31% 0.44% 0.69%
Ratio of std. deviation to GDP’s: σX/σY R 2.28 7.33 1.68
Correlation with GDP 0.57 -0.12 0.82
Correlation with Entry 0.41 0.02 0.75
Autocorrelation (1st order) 0.95 0.77 0.69
Table 2.2: Second Moments
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2.7 Conclusion
In the aftermath of the collapse of house prices during the Great Recession and the waves of loan
defaults that followed, there was documented decline in the birth of new firms. Preceding and
during this episode, the dynamics of firm entry suggest the existence of important link to house
prices and loan charge-off volumes. In this paper, given the role of firm creation in business
cycle, I provided empirical evidence through Structural-VAR model demonstrating that entry,
consumption, and output respond positively to house price shock and negatively to loan default
shock. Then I built a DSGE model that brings the same responses, and delivers a transmission
mechanism of the financial shocks through endogenous collateral value and firm entry. In the
baseline version of the model, loan default that is triggered in the “unproductive” borrower
household’s sector causes unexpected losses for the lender, and is transmitted to the constrained
investor borrower through lower asset prices. The reduced access to obtain credit -coupled with
drop in profit expectations- attracts less entrants, and the contraction in output is amplified
compared to the version with fixed number of firms. Then two exercises were conducted for
robustness check considering different entry cost definition and commercial house investment.
Furthermore, the model is extended to incorporate a banking sector as financial intermediate
between the saver and borrower agents. The presence of banker magnifies and propagates the
impact of default shock on investment through higher borrowing costs and lower asset prices.
Besides, I define a second default shock originated from the borrower entrepreneur, in the face
of which the model predicts a decline in entry and output, but this response is muted when
compared to the one provoked by the unproductive agent. Moreover, the feedback to positive
house demand shock is a rise in number of entrants following an appreciation in the collateral
value. Also, the creditworthiness of the borrower plays a role in amplifying the impact of the
shocks on new firm investment. In addition, heterogeneous mass of agents was introduced
to the model which showed that the impact of default shock on birth and output gets larger
as the share of the defaulter in the economy gets bigger, but simultaneously dampening the
amplification through endogenous entry. Lastly, the extended model produces some second
moments that are quite close to the ones observed in data, namely, the relative volatilities to
output’s (measured by the ratio of variable’s standard deviation to GDP’s).
The model can be enriched by incorporating some other features that were missing in this
paper. In fact, the next step is to bring the model to data by estimating it in Bayesian
framework, because it is crucial to obtain reasonable estimates for the model parameters that
reflect actual data, specifically the shares of the agents as they had non-negligible effects on
the magnitudes of the shocks.
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Interpretation Equation

























Euler equation for share holding vt = Et
[
(1− δ)ΛEt,t+1(dt+1 + vt+1)
]









































Firms’ entry condition vt = fE








Law of motion for the number of firms Nt = (1− δ)(Nt−1 +NEt−1)










Labor market clearing αPLPt + α
ILIt + α
ELEt = Lt
Credit market clearing αPDt = α
IBIt + α
EBEt
House market clearing αPhPt + α
IhIt + α
EhEt = 1

































































Loan default shock εIt = ρεε
I
t−1 + uεI ,t
Table 2.3: Baseline Model Summary
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Parameter Interpretation Value
βP Patient Household’s discount factor 0.9925
βI Impatient Household’s discount factor 0.94
βE Entrepreneur Household’s discount factor 0.94
βB Banker’s discount factor 0.945
θ Elasticity of substitution between goods 6
ϕ Elasticity of labor supply 4
δ Firm’s exit probability 0.025
fE Entrant’s fixed cost parameter 1
m Loan-to-value ratio 0.7
mB Liabilities-to-assets ratio (banker) 0.9
A Steady state productivity 1















































Table 2.5: Long Run Ratios
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Appendix A
The Baseline Model with Commercial
Houses
It is presented in this section only the modified equations in the presence of commercial house





t − hEt−1)+qt(hCt − hCt−1) + vt(Nt +NEt )xt+1
≤ wtLEt +BEt + rht hCt + (dt + vt)Ntxt (A.1)
hCt is the stock of commercial houses, and r
h
t is the rental cost of those houses. The first order
condition with respect to hCt is:







Note that according to (A.2) -by solving forward without speculative bubbles- the house price









On the production side, firm i maximizes each period’s real profits by choosing labor Li,t,
































Symmetry among the operating firms allows us to write the aggregate commercial house de-




1This goes in line with the present value model that assumes the house price to be equal to the discounted
present value of all future rents.
2We calibrate the income share of labor ζ = 0.64.
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t ) = 1 (A.10)
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Appendix B
The Equations of The Extended Model
Apart from firms, assume that the economy is populated by four types of agents: patient,
impatient, entrepreneur and banker, each with its corresponding mass αP , αI , αE and αB and
discount factors: βP , βI , βE and βB. We normalize the total mass to one, hence imposing:
αP + αI + αE + αB = 1.
Patient Household (Lender βB < βP )















subject to the following budget constraint in equilibrium:
CPt +Dt + qt(h
P
t − hPt−1) = wtLPt +Rt−1Dt−1 (B.1)




















where ΛPt,t+1 ≡ βP
CPt
CPt+1
is patient household’s consumption based discount factor.
Impatient “Unproductive” Household (Borrower βI < βB)
The impatient borrower maximizes the utility:





















t − hIt−1) = wtLIt +BIt + εIt (B.5)










The optimal behavior of the household leads to the following labor supply, loan demand,





































is the consumption based discount factor.
Impatient Investor Household (Borrower Entrepreneur βE < βB)














































The optimality conditions yield to the following labor supply, loan demand, house demand

































(1− δ)ΛEt,t+1(dt+1 + vt+1)
]
(B.15)






is entrepreneur household’s consumption based discount factor.
The Banker


























The banker’s borrowing constraint is given by the form:
DBt = m
BBBt (B.17)
Resulted from the optimal behavior of the banker we obtain deposit demand, and loan
supply conditions:

















is banker’s consumption based discount factor.
Incumbents (Operating Firms)
After imposing symmetry across the Nt producing firms, the formulas for marginal cost, pricing,























The free entry condition is expressed by the following equation:
vt = f
E (B.24)
while the law of motion for the number of firms is given by:
Nt = (1− δ)(Nt−1 +NEt−1) (B.25)
Markets Clearing



















EhEt = 1 (B.30)
Shocks
Loan defaults and house preference shocks follow AR(1) processes:
εIt = ρεε
I
t−1 + uεI ,t (B.31)
εEt = ρεε
E










where uεI ,t, uεE ,t, and uj,t are i.i.d.
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